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Abstract 
Analyses of UN peacekeeping increasingly consider legitimacy a key factor for success, 
conceiving of it as a resource that operations should seek and use in the pursuit of their goals. 
However, these analyses rarely break down legitimacy by source. Because the UN is an 
organization with multiple identities and duties however, different legitimacy sources—in 
particular output and procedural legitimacy—and the UN’s corresponding legitimation 
practices come into conflict in the context of peacekeeping. Drawing on a range of examples 
and a specific case of the UN mission in Congo, this article argues that looking at different 
legitimacy sources and linking them to the institutional identity of the UN is thus critical and 
it shows how the UN’s in contradictory legitimation practices can reduce overall legitimacy 
perceptions.  
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Introduction 
Analyses and understandings of UN peacekeeping have increasingly considered the 
legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of such operations. On the one hand, scholars and practitioners 
imply that there is a moral requirement to justify the presence of a peacekeeping mission to 
the populations of host countries, countries that risk the lives of their troops in UN missions, 
and donor governments and their taxpayers who foot the bill for these operations.1 On the 
other hand, legitimacy is frequently cited as critical to the operational effectiveness of 
peacekeeping and therefore understood as something that has practical utility in the 
realization of peace and stability in war-torn states. The 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines (known as the Capstone Doctrine), for example, calls 
legitimacy a key ‘success factor,’ declaring that, ‘in order to succeed, United Nations peace 
operations need to be seen as legitimate’ (36). Similarly, Mark Suchman (1995, 576) calls 
legitimacy ‘an operational resource that organizations…employ in pursuit of their goals’ 
(italics in original). 
As the literature exploring the link between UN peacekeeping and legitimacy 
expands, increasing attention has also been paid to the various audiences of legitimacy in the 
context of peacekeeping, with a particular focus on the need for local populations to view the 
UN as legitimate (Coleman 2017, 2007; Donais 2009; Pouligny 2006; Whalan 2017). What 
has received less attention, however, is how different sources of legitimacy affect judgments 
of legitimacy in peacekeeping, whether from local populations or other audiences, such as the 
Security Council or the governments and populations of troop contributing countries (TCCs). 
Indeed, assessments of the legitimacy of UN peace operations often do not take into account 
any subdivision of legitimacy, instead focusing simply on whether the interventions are or are 
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not legitimate in an absolute sense or focusing on only one source of legitimacy (UN 2008; 
Gow and Dandeker 1995; Mersiades 2006). Because this undifferentiated approach to 
legitimacy leaves out the source of legitimacy, however, it fails to acknowledge that 
legitimacy is not a cohesive concept, but instead one that is multifaceted, contested, and 
conceived of in different ways by both the UN and those with whom it interacts in 
peacekeeping. This renders most pronouncements on the legitimacy of UN peace operations 
at best over-simplistic and at worst misleading.  
In this article, I argue that looking at different legitimacy sources—in particular 
output and procedural legitimacy—and linking them to the institutional identity of the UN is 
critical, because these different legitimacies come into conflict in the context of UN peace 
operations. More specifically, the UN has multiple identities in peacekeeping: it is both an 
operational actor that participates concretely in stabilization and peace consolidation, 
deploying troops, materials, and resources to war-torn countries, and it is a normative actor 
that embodies and projects norms and principles at the international level (von Billerbeck 
2016). The ‘operational UN’ derives legitimacy primarily from outputs—that is, from what it 
achieves—while the ‘normative UN’ derives legitimacy primarily from procedural —that is, 
from the way in which it behaves. However, in peacekeeping, the efficient achievement of 
outputs and the compliance with institutional norms and principles can conflict, thus forcing 
the UN into a situation where it must ‘choose between’ output and procedural legitimacy. 
The contradiction between these two sources of legitimacy, and more broadly between the 
normative and operational identities of the UN, leads to contradictions between the UN’s 
discourse and its practices in peacekeeping, ultimately reducing overall judgments of its 
legitimacy by its various audiences.  
The first part of this article is conceptual, applying theories and understandings of 
legitimacy, legitimation, and organizational behaviour to UN peacekeeping operations. I 
examine legitimacy and legitimation and the ways in which the UN’s multiple identities 
dictate different sources of legitimacy in peacekeeping, and as mentioned, I find that two 
sources in particular are relevant: procedural legitimacy and output legitimacy. I then turn to 
an empirical examination of the legitimation practices of UN peacekeeping operations, 
showing how the organization attempts to balance between these two legitimacies and how 
this results in contradictions between the UN’s discourse and its practices. I draw examples 
from three UN peacekeeping operations to illustrate my points, including those in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, and Liberia.2 I then use the case of Congo 
specifically to show how these contradictions render the UN highly inconsistent and reduce 
its legitimacy in the eyes of one of the UN’s legitimacy audiences, the host country 
population.3  
The data for the empirical sections of this article are drawn from primary documents, 
secondary literature on the missions, and semi-structured interviews with UN staff and with 
local actors in Congo.4 The missions in Congo, East Timor, and Liberia were selected 
according to two criteria. First, they are representative of different ‘styles’ of contemporary 
peacekeeping, enabling me to widen the applicability of my findings across peacekeeping. 
The missions in Congo and Liberia are among the UN’s largest and operate(d) in conditions 
of internecine, multi-party conflicts and ongoing fighting; the mission in East Timor was an 
international transitional administration and thus usurped executive power from the 
government for many aspects of the country’s political transition, but did not, at least 
initially, encounter such extreme insecurity as in the other two settings. Second and crucially, 
these cases vary on the degree of intrusion by the UN and thus the UN faced different 
challenges in terms of justifying and legitimating its presence to the host country population, 
the particular legitimacy audience that I focus on. While this article does not offer an in-depth 
empirical analysis of legitimacy judgments by all potential audiences in particular settings—a 
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worthy topic for future research—it provides a general mapping of contradictory legitimation 
practices across a sample of missions and of how legitimacy audiences may view these 
inconsistencies, thus enabling broader conclusions about the variability of legitimacy in 
contexts of post-conflict peacekeeping and about the UN’s behaviour more generally.  
 
Sources of Legitimacy  
Legitimacy is traditionally conceived of as a status ascribed by one actor to another 
based on shared understandings of what is appropriate, good, or correct; it is often thought to 
characterize a relationship between ruler and ruled and serves to justify the exercise of power 
by the former towards the latter (Coicaud 2002; Gilley 2009; Hurd 2007; Franck 1990; Clark 
2005; Beetham 1991; Mulligan 2005). Coleman (2007) adds that legitimacy can apply both to 
actions and actors. As noted in the Introduction to this Special Issue, however, these 
conceptions, which were largely developed in state-based analytical frameworks, neglect the 
fleeting nature of power, the changeability of relations and alliances, the proliferation of 
potential audiences for legitimacy, and the lack of agreement on what constitute appropriate, 
good, or correct behaviour in conflict and post-conflict settings (von Billerbeck and Gippert 
2017).  
In addition to the questionable applicability of common understandings of legitimacy 
to conflict and post-conflict contexts, there has been a failure to consider different sources of 
legitimacy in peacekeeping. While many typologies have been posited by scholars, four 
sources are particularly relevant here.5 First, procedural legitimacy focuses on how an actor 
or organization achieves its stated goals and holds that the processes that lead to outputs 
should adhere to accepted and shared principles and norms (Clark 2005; Steffek 2003). In the 
case of peacekeeping, this entails compliance on the part of the UN with institutional 
principles and norms in the conduct of its activities in host countries. Second, output 
legitimacy stems from performance and effectiveness, stressing that whether and to what 
degree an entity achieves its stated goals is the source of legitimacy (Clark, 2005; Scharpf 
1999; Suchman 1995). In the case of peacekeeping, output legitimacy relates to whether the 
mission delivers on key mandated tasks, such as security, protection of civilians, and political 
reform, and it is relatively more quantifiable than procedural legitimacy. Third, source 
legitimacy focuses on the mandate, capacity, and constitution of an entity. In peacekeeping, 
this legitimacy relates to the mission’s initial claim to authority on arrival, usually enshrined 
in its mandate, and to judgments at the outset about whether the mission is considered 
capable of achieving its goals (Whalan 2013, 65). In the case of UN peacekeeping, of 
particular relevance to source legitimacy is the fact that the UN is a universal inter-
governmental organization comprising nearly all the states in the international system, a fact 
that bestows it with a unique source legitimacy when it is first tasked with peacekeeping. 
Fourth, legal legitimacy distinguishes legitimacy from legality in order to highlight that 
actions can be legitimate without being strictly legal, as, for example, the NATO bombing of 
Kosovo in 1999 (Roberts 2003). In UN peacekeeping, mandates, Status of Forces 
Agreements, and other Memoranda of Understanding between the UN and the host country 
government constitute the bases for the legal legitimacy of the mission.  
While these various legitimacy sources are all relevant to some degree in 
peacekeeping, the first two— procedural and output—are the most important for my analysis. 
Source legitimacy and legal legitimacy provide an important basis for a mission to be initially 
accepted in a host country, but they are less useful in discovering how legitimacy is created, 
endures, and evolves over the life of a peacekeeping operation. More specifically, the UN’s 
universal membership and global nature provide a legitimacy that buttresses its claims to be 
the correct organization for the job, but it does not provide the UN with ongoing grounds for 
that claim. Indeed, a peacekeeping mission would be hard pressed to continue invoking that 
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unchanging aspect of its identity in order to generate renewed legitimacy over time. 
Likewise, though mandates and other legal instruments are renewed on a regular basis during 
the life of a peacekeeping operation, because they are concluded exclusively with the host 
government and not with any wider segment of the population, the legal legitimacy they 
bestow presents only a partial picture of overall legitimacy assessments. By contrast, how the 
UN behaves in peacekeeping and what it achieves constitute ongoing sources of legitimacy 
that reaffirm for a wide audience the UN’s rightness for the job and ability to continue 
delivering tangible results. This line of argument blurs the distinction between the legitimacy 
of an actor and its actions. An actor’s identity must be demonstrated, affirmed, and 
reaffirmed on a continuous basis for it to remain legitimate, and this must be done through 
actions that show consistency, cohesion, and unity of purpose and principle over time. In 
peacekeeping, the UN as an actor may be able to remain legitimate even where it takes 
illegitimate actions, but only if doing so is the exception rather than the rule; persistent 
illegitimate action would certainly reduce the overall legitimacy of the UN as an intervening 
force.  
However, with a few exceptions, few analysis of peacekeeping take into account 
either the distinction between what an actor does and what an actor is, nor of any other 
subdivision of legitimacy (Whalan 2013; Mersiades 2005; Lipson 2007). Naturally, since 
different actors will value different sources of legitimacy, an understanding of those sources 
is key, both to how legitimacy judgments are made by various actors and to how the UN 
seeks and claims legitimacy—that is, legitimation. Indeed, the recognition that legitimacy is 
important to peacekeeping has led the UN to engage in a variety of legitimation practices 
aimed at boosting legitimacy in the eyes of a number of audiences, but without attention to 
how different legitimation practices complement or contradict one another or what types of 
legitimacy are valued by different audiences.  
Most understandings of legitimation focus on the need to justify the exercise of power 
as a way of securing the consent of those subject to it. Legitimation is thus thought to entail 
actions that validate an actor’s claim to authority by ensuring that it is subject to shared 
principles and is exercised in the interest of shared goals (Beetham 1991); as such, 
legitimation validates or reinforces an actor’s identity and in particular its identity as a power 
holder (Barker 2001). Seeking the consent of the governed is thus not only a pursuit of their 
acquiescence to specific actions or practices of authority, but an agreement, implicit or 
explicit and renewed on an ongoing basis, that the actor in question has the right to rule or to 
exercise power in general, as just described.  
This understanding of legitimation, however, assumes that the actor in question has a 
clear and cohesive identity that can be recognized and validated. While this may be true in 
some instances, in the case of UN peace operations, the organization’s identity is not unitary 
but multifaceted, thus complicating the organization’s legitimation efforts. As described, the 
UN is at once a normative actor dedicated to the development and dissemination of norms 
and principles and an operational actor participating in concrete ways in the management of 
conflicts. While there is nothing intrinsic about these different identities that makes them 
oppositional, in the context of peace operations, they often dictate different goals and 
obligations, different ways of behaving, and different sources of legitimacy that can conflict 
with one another. Accordingly, in seeking to legitimate one side of its identity, the UN may 
de-legitimize another, thus imperiling overall judgments of legitimacy.  
 
Contradictory Goals in Peacekeeping  
Much recent scholarship on peacekeeping has highlighted the fact that it is a practice 
marked by contradictions and incongruities, in what has come to be called ‘dilemma 
analysis,’ where peacekeeping practitioners find themselves in paradoxical situations relating 
 5 
 
to dependency, duration, and participation (Paris and Sisk 2009). For example, deployment in 
large numbers and the use of coercive measures may stop fighting or human rights abuses, 
but may create dependency on the UN for continued security. Similarly, the tasks that 
contemporary multidimensional peacekeeping proposes to undertake—such as building of 
resilient political institutions, security sector reform, and reconciliation between conflict 
parties—are long-term projects, the longer the UN remains in a country, the greater the risk 
of opposition and even aggression towards it among the local population. The UN may 
likewise be obliged to interact with actors responsible for war crimes, abuses against 
civilians, or corruption and fraud in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities, but doing 
so may be seen as an implicit condoning of their activities, and thus derail efforts to secure 
post-war justice and reconciliation. 
These dilemmas can usually be attributed to the broader tension between two 
imperatives facing the UN: that of upholding norms relating to self-determination and non-
interference that are enshrined in the organization’s Charter and that of maintaining 
international peace and security.6 While the UN has always supported the principle of self-
determination, more recently, it has come to be seen as a key determinant of success in the 
UN’s post-conflict peacekeeping activities because it is believed to render those activities 
more legitimate. If the UN designs, implements, and manages post-conflict reconstruction, it 
will be viewed as neo-imperial and out of touch with local needs and desires, and hence 
illegitimate. The activities described earlier, such as institution building and reconciliation, 
are processes that are usually off-limits to external interference and are constitutive of a 
country’s self-determination; their management by outside actors thus represents a violation 
of the UN’s stated principles (Saul 2011). By contrast, peacekeeping operations that build the 
capacity of local actors to envision, design, and implement their own peace consolidation and 
reconstruction processes; that remain temporary in nature; and that ensure wide participation 
and local ownership are more acceptable and appropriate.7  
At the same time, as much as the UN is mandated to uphold self-determination, it is 
equally tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, and thus it is obliged 
to take action—even intrusive action—where these are deemed at risk. Indeed, many contend 
that a UN peacekeeping mission is only deployed because local actors failed to manage their 
societal disputes independently without recourse to violence, indicating that a violation of 
self-determination may be required in order to engender the stability, resilience and 
reconciliation for which the UN strives (Chesterman 2007, 7). The Capstone Doctrine, 
recognizes that ‘multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation[s] may be 
obliged, in the short-term, to take on important state-like functions, such as the provision of 
security and the maintenance of public order’ (UN 2008, 40). Yet, as Saul (2011, 174) notes, 
‘the level of international involvement that is necessary to make a significant difference is 
likely to conflict with the principle of self-determination.’ 
In this way, two of the UN’s primary roles—that of a norm developer and diffuser and 
that of the main international organization charged with international peace and security—
come in to conflict in the context of peacekeeping operations.8 Deep intrusion and a degree of 
external imposition may be the only way the UN can effectively build peace, but will entail a 
violation of its normative obligation to uphold and exemplify the values and principles 
enshrined in its Charter.  
 
Multiple Identities and Conflicting Legitimacies 
This conflict between the UN’s responsibilities towards peace and security and 
towards the principles of self-determination and non-imposition are reflective of the fact that 
the UN as an organization has both normative and operational identities (Lipson 2007). 
Importantly, different sources of legitimacy matter for these different identities. While the 
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‘normative UN’ is concerned with appropriate procedure and behaving in ways that respect 
institutional principles (Lipson 2007, 12), the ‘operational UN’ needs to show results and to 
demonstrate that it has delivered concrete and quantifiable outputs in the interests of 
international peace and security, and if it does not, ‘[its] lack of effectiveness injures [its] 
legitimacy’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 168).9 In short, the former derives legitimacy from 
procedure and the latter from output.  
Not only do the UN’s identities imply different sources of legitimacy in the context of 
its peace operations, but procedural and output legitimacy also imply different practices of 
legitimation. One of the main ways in which actors seek procedural legitimacy is through 
discourse, that is, declarations of adherence to particular norms and principles relating to 
modes of behaviour. According to Steffek (2003, 261-4), the act of ‘giving reasons’ enables 
actors or institutions to rationally convince others of their legitimacy, rather than rely on the 
acceptance of their authority on a theoretical or conjectural basis. Accordingly, this kind of 
legitimation often entails acts of communication and representation that employ the language 
of and attempt to demonstrate commitment to values, norms, and appropriate behaviour 
(Hurd 2001, 2007; Barker 2001).  
By contrast, output legitimacy is generated and affirmed through the efficient delivery 
of demonstrable and tangible results usually in the short term, and thus acts of legitimation 
and judgments of legitimacy are less reliant on discourse or symbolism, and are, as 
mentioned above, relatively more quantifiable and visible. They often focus on projects 
where results come about quickly, rather than longer-term, slower processes of change.10 A 
strict dichotomy is of course over-simplistic—concrete results need to be advertised and 
communicated and will have normative content and discourse will refer to targets and 
deliverables. Still, the UN’s legitimation practices in peacekeeping have two overall thrusts—
the discursive and the practical—which are geared towards the generation of procedural and 
output legitimacy respectively.  
As discussed, however, in UN peace operations, norm compliance and operational 
effectiveness may clash. Accordingly, if legitimation entails, at least in part, efforts to 
reaffirm an institutional identity, how can an organization with two identities that come into 
conflict simultaneously reaffirm them? How can the UN declare and demonstrate adherence 
to principles when its actions may tell a different story? Should the UN prioritize efforts 
towards procedural legitimacy or towards output legitimacy? What type of legitimacy matters 
most to the UN’s various legitimacy audiences in peacekeeping?  
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have suggested that international organizations often 
emphasize compliance with and advocacy for rules, principles, and norms above the 
achievement of concrete results. The UN in particular is often looked to for leadership on 
normative or ethical matters and its ongoing adherence to and promotion of international 
principles and values has become one of the main ways in which it justifies its continued 
relevance and authority (Claude 1966; Hurd 2007; Rubinstein 2008). This prioritization of 
norms and principles over the delivery of quantifiable outputs can also be explained as 
behaviour motivated by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of expected 
consequences’ (March and Olsen 1998). According to the former, ideas and identities better 
explain the motivations of actors in the international system; according to the latter, material 
factors, preferences, and interests constitute actors’ key motivations. Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004, 39) call this greater emphasis on upholding norms and principles relative to the 
achievement of operational targets a type of ‘dysfunction.’ They suggest that organizations 
that do this prize a kind of ‘symbolic legitimacy’ of the kind described above over efficiency, 
cost-effectiveness, and speed in the achievement of targets—in other words, they value 
procedural legitimacy over output legitimacy.  
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However, particularly in peacekeeping operations, where its conflicting institutional 
imperatives are laid bare, the UN rarely sacrifices its operational objectives to normative 
processes in the way that Barnett and Finnemore suggest it may, and instead it attempts to 
balance between them. This is not because the UN vacillates between different logics of 
action, but because it views both of these imperatives—the concrete achievement of security 
tasks and delivery of outputs and the preservation of host country self-determination—as 
important sources of legitimacy (see Coleman, 2017). As Lipson (2007, 13) argues, ‘[t]he UN 
is not a purely political organization, but also must produce action.’  
 
Contradictory Legitimation Practices 
The outcome of this balancing act, however, is that there are often contradictions 
between the UN’s peacekeeping discourse and practices (von Billerbeck 2016). By 
simultaneously seeking to maintain host country self-determination and intrude deeply 
enough to have a material impact upon political stability and security, the UN ends up 
engaging in inconsistent and incongruous legitimation practices. Indeed, it often engages in 
activities that aim to achieve visible outputs with a view to signaling its efficiency and 
effectiveness and thus gain legitimacy based on performance, but with little regard for the 
building of national capacities, keeping missions temporary, and including a broad range of 
actors in its activities. At the same time, it heavily emphasizes the importance of these latter 
points in its discourse in a bid to project its dedication to the self-determination of the host 
country and the imperative to minimize interference and imposition. This occurs particularly 
in relation to the dilemma areas mentioned above—dependency, duration, and participation. 
 First, the UN will at times take forceful action with regards to the security situation on 
a unilateral basis, without simultaneously training national actors to take up those security 
tasks later. In Congo, MONUC initiated the International Security and Stabilization Support 
Strategy (ISSSS) in 2008 in a bid to improve security, extend state authority, ensure safe 
return and recovery for displaced persons, and deter further fighting in the east of the country, 
which remained highly unstable long after the formal end of the conflict. However, the initial 
plans were ‘sketche[d] on the back of an envelope’ by senior mission staff with no input from 
national actors; one staff member recalled that the overall attitude within the UN was 
‘participation lite,’ with importance placed instead on demonstrating decisive improvements 
in security to the government, host population, and donors so as to retain or increase their 
support of the mission.11 Another staff member closely working on the ISSSS asserted that 
the UN’s ‘objective…is not to develop capacity in the longer term, it is to restore security, 
open roads, get things going again.’12 Several others reiterated the importance of delivering 
peace dividends to the population that are ‘tangible’13 and ‘quick.’14 UN staff told a similar 
story in Liberia, with one describing the most important goals of the mission as ‘[g]et the 
arms away from the thugs, break down the structures, and try to get a few peace dividends on 
the ground’ but ‘not…[build] capacity.’15 
Even where the UN does undertake capacity building, it can often be with an eye to 
boosting demonstrable targets rapidly, rather than boosting self-determination. In Liberia, for 
example, UN Police (UNPOL) trained members of the new Liberian National Police 
beginning in 2004, with an ambitious target of 3,500 officers trained and deployed by 2007. 
Not only was the curriculum designed without much Liberian input, the trainings themselves 
were initially just three months long (though this was later extended to six months) (Friedman 
2011). These actions all prioritize reaching targets above host country self-determination, in a 
bid to demonstrate visible successes quickly and satisfy a number of legitimacy audiences, 
including the host country population, donors, and others. As one senior DPKO official 
noted, ‘[sometimes] you pick a fight you can win in order to signal the end of the rule of the 
gun and the beginning of the rule of law; but it’s theater, show, it’s about signaling.’16 
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At the same time, the UN’s discourse tends to put a heavy emphasis on building 
national capacity in a bid to convince others through discourse of the fact that it is 
approaching peacekeeping in the ‘appropriate’ way, a way that puts self-determination first 
and takes the enhancement of national capacities as a priority. The recently published Report 
of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (known as HIPPO) stresses the 
need to ‘build future capacities to better prevent the scourge of war’ (UN 2015, 32), and both 
this report and the earlier Capstone Doctrine (UN 2008) highlight the importance of training 
efforts, particularly in the security sector. The discursive emphasis here, is on boosting the 
capacities of national actors so that peacebuilding and reconstruction can be self-determined, 
with little said about quantifiable targets. This too is a form of signaling, but instead it uses 
discourse to demonstrate the UN’s commitment to appropriate and nationally-oriented 
procedures, thus contradicting its efforts to gain legitimacy based on short-term outputs 
achieved with little or no regard for national capacities.  
Second, though peacekeeping is by definition temporary, many operations remain in 
place for protracted periods due to, as mentioned, the long-term nature of many of the 
activities they undertake, and the extended presence of the UN over time often leads to 
resentment on the part of the host government and population as well as intensifies any 
dependence that may have developed. David Edelstein (2009, 83) refers to this as an 
‘obsolescing welcome,’ in which ‘national groups that are accustomed to governing 
themselves …bridle at living under the control of foreign political and military 
organizations’; at the same time, he notes, they often remain reliant on those very foreign 
organizations for security and stability.  
For example, the UN’s presence in East Timor was intended to be a temporary 
phenomenon, providing assistance in the transition to full independence; yet the country 
ended up seeing a succession of missions and follow-on missions that extended the UN’s 
presence in the country until 2012.17 While this underlines the fact that major political 
transitions and post-conflict reconstruction usually occur in a stop-start way rather than as a 
linear progression, it also underlines the fact that the country was in many ways still reliant 
on the UN for certain functions, such as security, well into its transitional period.18 MONUC 
and UNMIL are also both examples of multidimensional peacekeeping operations that have 
remained in place for over a decade each and where the population is weary of their presence 
but still dependent on it, at least partly, for security.19 As one former senior UN military 
commander noted, ‘Liberia [is] still fully supported by the UN—if the UN left, [Liberia] 
would revert to conflict.’20 A senior DPKO official noted that having the mission in Congo 
‘[stay] indefinitely [would be] better for peace,’ specifying that leaving prematurely would 
cause the UN to lose credibility as most visible improvements in security would likely 
dissipate.21 
However, despite the fact that many UN missions have turned out to be relatively 
long-lived and the countries that host them show little readiness for their departure, the UN’s 
discourse continues to emphasize the temporary nature of peacekeeping and the need for 
national actors to play a leading role. The Best Practices Unit’s Handbook on United Nations 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (UN 2003, 112) describes UN missions as 
having ‘short life spans.’ The Capstone Doctrine (UN 2008) echoes this, noting that 
peacekeeping operations are ‘neither designed nor equipped to engage in longer-term 
institution and capacity-building efforts’ (28) and that the role of the UN should ‘diminish 
quickly’ (37). Similarly, the Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (UN 2009, 15) asserts that ‘[u]sing and supporting national 
capacity should be the first preference’ and the completion of peacebuilding tasks by the UN 
something that should occur ‘on a short-term and limited basis.’ In this way, despite the 
growing longevity of most contemporary peacekeeping operations, the UN insists 
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discursively that missions are not only temporary, but short-lived, a stance that fits with its 
emphasis on keeping intervention and imposition to a minimum. 
Third, the UN may interact in the short term with actors alleged to have committed or 
condoned atrocities, human rights abuses, or war crimes in the interests of consolidating a 
fragile peace agreement or avoiding a return to violence, but in the long term it may then 
attempt to back off from relationships with such actors. In Congo, for example, the UN 
facilitated an agreement between Peter Karim Udaga, leader of the Front des Nationalistes et 
des Intégrationnistes (FNI) rebel group in the northeastern district of Ituri, and the Congolese 
government in 2006. Despite allegations of FNI involvement in atrocities, abuses against 
civilians, and child recruitment, part of the deal involved granting Karim the rank of colonel 
in the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Such bargains are 
considered necessary in order to demonstrate progress towards ending conflict and thus the 
UN’s contribution to peace and stability.22 Nevertheless, while these deals may help achieve 
immediate stabilization goals, they certainly do little to further the cause of justice. Indeed, 
UN staff are quick to declare their refusal to interact with anyone implicated in atrocities and 
the need to end impunity and bring human rights abusers to justice (see UN 2004), with one 
noting that ‘if you deal with…thugs, you lose your moral standing.’23  
Relatedly, in most security related matters, MONUC found it generally more 
expedient to work with members of the FARDC who had been officers in the Forces Armées 
Congolaises (FAC) and Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) during the Mobutu era and pre-war 
years rather than with members of more recently-formed rebel groups. While the latter often 
had minimal training or general education, the former had often had advanced military tuition 
in the US, Europe, and elsewhere prior to the wars, and MONUC staff admitted that they 
made better partners for the mission due to their knowledge of military strategy, 
understanding of the hierarchies, logistics, and management of armed forces, and enhanced 
ability to operate jointly with other national militaries—in short, their ability to help the UN 
achieve its stated objectives.24  
Similarly, in spite of its heavy emphasis on local ownership, the UN may consult with 
national actors through meetings and joint initiatives, but then act unilaterally, with little 
substantive input from national actors or in consultation with only a few elite partners (von 
Billerbeck 2016). For example, the UN often conducts assessments in the early stages of 
missions. While these Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs) or Post-Conflict Needs 
Assessments (PCNAs) have become longer, more inclusive processes, most staff admit that 
they are largely an effort to get national actors ‘on board’ with what the UN wants, rather 
than a true negotiation to assess needs and capacities and develop priorities and objectives 
from scratch.25 Likewise, though the writing of the post-independence constitution in East 
Timor was ostensibly led by the Timorese themselves, there was heavy UN influence, and 
one UN staff member characterized Timorese involvement as ‘a pretense.’26 Another 
recalled, ‘sometimes the prime minister [in East Timor] sign[ed] this…project, so it’s their 
project. But we have drafted it, word for word.’27 These staff members admitted that the 
intent in taking this approach was to get results quickly because insisting on co-
implementation with local actors ‘slowed everything down to no end.’28  
In the case of Timor, the UN’s intrusiveness and dominance in the country led to 
widespread resentment against the organization, prompting it to introduce a policy of 
‘Timorization’ to include more national actors in key political decisions. This is particularly 
notable because UNTAET was initially welcomed with relative goodwill in the country, due 
to the fact that it was not there to negotiate between former warring parties, but to help a 
relatively cohesive post-independence government get on its feet.29 Even in what could be 
characterized as among the most favorable conditions the UN is likely to encounter when 
deploying to a country, resentment among the political elites at the abrogation of self-
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determination and the high level of intrusion, which run contrary to what the UN declares as 
guiding principles, developed quickly. And even once Timorization was introduced, many 
question how much it actually did to include the Timorese in a substantive way in the taking 
of key decisions and implementation of key tasks. McDowell (2006, 187) notes that many 
considered Timorization to consist only of ‘empty gestures.’ It appears that it may have been, 
at least partly, a discursive tool intended to allay national concerns and generate procedural 
legitimacy.  
Relatedly, the UN often emphasizes democracy, transparency, and inclusivity in 
discourse, yet it only sometimes behaves in line with those principles, often engaging instead 
in closed decision-making, excluding particular groups, and behaving in an opaque manner. 
This is done not out of a rejection of the principles of democracy, transparency, and 
inclusivity or a lack of belief in their importance, but instead out of an interest in achieving 
results as quickly, efficiently, and cost-effectively as possible in order to maximize output 
legitimacy. The HIPPO report (UN 2015, 72) admirably declares that, ‘[u]nnecessary 
formalism, process and bureaucracy should give way to a new commitment to putting in 
place streamlined processes and more transparent procedures and decision-making’; the UN’s 
discourse thus clearly stresses the need for principled procedures. Similarly, the report (UN 
2015, 25) emphasizes the need for ‘inclusive and participatory peace processes,’ echoing the 
Capstone Doctrine’s earlier call for ‘wide representation, inclusiveness, and gender 
considerations’ (UN 2008, 39).  
Staff admit, however, that in practice they often sacrifice these principles for the sake 
of hitting their quantifiable targets. One MONUC official conceded that, ‘we just do things 
for [local actors] sometimes because there is a pressure to deliver.’30 Another noted that 
peacekeeping requires ‘speed and urgency’ and so the UN should only involve actors where 
they do not impinge upon the ability to quickly reach targets.31 ‘Cutting normative corners,’ 
then, and both disregarding the extent of host country self-determination and deepening the 
degree of UN intrusion become acceptable as ways of boosting output legitimacy, even if 
doing so comes at the expense of procedural legitimacy. 
 
Implications for Legitimacy Judgments 
Evidently, there are clashes between the UN’s discourse and its actions in 
peacekeeping, where it declares its dedication to a particular set of principles, but often 
behaves in the interests of a different set of objectives, and the line between its procedural 
and output legitimation practices is thus blurred. Nils Brunsson (2002) calls this ‘organized 
hypocrisy,’ a dynamic that Lipson (2007, 5) describes as one ‘in which organizations respond 
to conflicting pressures in external environments through contradictory actions and 
statements.’ Stephen Krasner (1999, 66) asserts that organized hypocrisy occurs when there is 
a clash between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences, and he states that 
actors ‘must honor, perhaps only in talk, certain norms but at the same time act in ways that 
violate these norms.’ 
However, such contradictory legitimation practices have implications for overall 
assessments of the UN’s legitimacy: if behaviour appropriate to one side of the UN’s identity 
conflicts with behaviour appropriate to the other, then the many audiences that judge the 
UN’s legitimacy are likely to view the organization not as legitimate but instead inconsistent, 
arbitrary, and even hypocritical. This is particularly the case because the UN appears to 
undertake such contradictory discursive and operational practices with little analysis of what 
type of legitimacy is valued by its various legitimacy audiences.  
In this section, I examine how the conflicts between the UN’s discourse and practices 
in peacekeeping affect legitimacy judgments on the part of one audience: the population of 
the host country in Congo. Within this group, I look at two broad categories—political elites 
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and the general population as represented by civil society, academics, and journalists—during 
the period 2003-10.32 This subdivision does not, of course, capture the variety and 
heterogeneity of this group and the many different concerns, priorities, and viewpoints that 
people have, but this simple dichotomy serves to demonstrate heuristically how different 
audiences in peacekeeping settings prize different sources of legitimacy and how 
contradictions in the UN’s legitimation practices undercut their overall judgments of the 
UN’s legitimacy. 
For Congo’s political elites the UN’s legitimacy derived from both how things were 
done—as they sought to maximize their own control and participation in post-conflict 
reconstruction and political development—and what was done, with elites often demanding 
and indeed expecting the rapid disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of 
forces, reconstruction of roads and other key infrastructure, and holding of elections. Of 13 
in-depth interviews with government officials, senior politicians, and military officers, all felt 
that it was the UN’s job to deliver concrete results in terms of security, elections, and socio-
economic well-being. They argued that the UN had both the financial and human resources 
and the technical expertise to deliver these kinds of substantive outputs, and they expressed 
not only an expectation, but a sense of entitlement to those resources. At the same time, they 
rejected any suggestion that the UN should also be in charge of managing such projects and 
stressed that the UN must leave decisions about the timing, location, and nature of those 
undertakings to them—in short, that they should be self-determined.  
As shown, however, where the UN behaves unilaterally in order to achieve quick 
results in the short-term and generate output legitimacy, it usually does not do so in any 
participatory way that preserves host-country self-determination and generates procedural 
legitimacy. Indeed, all but two interviewees who made no comment on the matter felt that the 
UN had failed to sufficiently include the Congolese in the processes of decision-making, 
setting of goals, and monitoring of implementation of mission activities, and several pointed 
out that for all its talk of inclusion, it generally failed to ensure a substantive role for 
Congolese. One declared that ‘the UN comes with fixed ideas of what it wants and imposes 
that on nationals.’33 Most others echoed the sentiment of being imposed upon, with one going 
so far as to describe the UN’s presence as ‘neo-colonialism’34 and one alleging that ‘the UN 
has no capacity for listening and speaks to us like a child.’ 35  
At the same time, among the 13 elite interviewees, 12 respondents felt that the UN 
had failed or mostly failed to demonstrate its ability to deliver concrete results with regards to 
security and only seven felt it had done enough to manage the electoral process, two of its 
key operational tasks. In this regard, they derided the UN for ‘hiding behind’ sovereignty and 
national ownership when justifying poor results and for its focus on following particular 
procedures aimed at signaling participation and inclusion, even where they slowed down the 
attainment of results. For example, several blamed the ongoing insecurity in the east of the 
country on the UN’s failure to ‘use its Chapter VII mandate’36 against recalcitrant rebel 
groups and its insistence instead on slow nationally-led processes of dialogue, stressing that 
this ‘mean[t] that people die[d].’37 Several others echoed this, criticizing the UN for ‘say[ing] 
that it cannot intervene between belligerents…that [it doesn’t] have the mandate’38 and one 
noting that ‘if the UN eradicated the FDLR [a rebel group comprising ex-génocidaires from 
Rwanda], it would gain a lot of credibility’ but pointing out instead that the mission always 
emphasized that removal of the FDLR must be a national decision.39 Another declared that 
the UN ‘has the money, resources, and mandate,’ but ‘it hasn’t managed to fulfill [its] 
mandate.’40 In this way, perceptions of illegitimacy derived from the UN’s failure to deliver 
on outputs and its discursive focus on procedure.  
The views of the broader population, as represented through civil society 
representatives, journalists, parliamentarians, and academics, were somewhat different. They 
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expressed only vague interest in procedures and were first and foremost concerned with 
outputs, and their assessments of the UN’s legitimacy derived nearly entirely from the latter. 
As one researcher summed it up, ‘[t]he views of the population on MONUC are based on 
results on the ground, not high-level ownership or partnerships.’41 It thus would appear that 
the population might be more accepting of a neglect of principles and norms than elites or at 
least that this would not damage their perceptions of the UN’s legitimacy. However, the UN’s 
focus on outputs also raised expectations among the population that they could expect results 
quickly and regularly across a range of issue areas, which the UN was ultimately unable to 
deliver, as just described. One analyst asserted that the mission ‘do[es] not build anything for 
the population, nothing permanent,’42 and another noted that ‘[w]hat the population needs is 
development, but the UN seems to just waste money.’43 On the provision of security, popular 
views echoed elite disappointment with the UN’s record, with one civil society representative 
stating that ‘people [feel] the UN [is] here to count the dead instead of to prevent [security 
incidents] from happening in the first place.’44  
In addition, even if the population did not view inclusive and nationally-led processes 
as a primary source of legitimacy, it was not unaware of the UN’s rhetoric in this regard. As a 
result, the UN was generally viewed as contradictory and confusing rather than efficient and 
helpful. One civil society representative noted that ‘there is a lot of suspicion of MONUC.’45 
Another alleged that ‘only a quarter of the population knows what the UN is doing,’46 while 
yet another reiterated the popular confusion about mission goals and added that, as a result, 
‘the population feels that MONUC is not with them and for them.’47 One noted bluntly that, 
‘[t]he population does not like the UN’s rhetoric,’ suggesting that the gap between its 
discourse and its practices was not lost on the population, and that its contradictory discourse 
and practices had deleterious effects on their overall assessments of its legitimacy.48  
As can be seen, different audiences—and here only two have been analysed—are 
interested in different types of legitimacy, and these are likely to vary further over time.49 Yet 
the UN tends to undertake practices of legitimation intended to demonstrate its legitimacy to 
these audiences with little dedicated analysis of how each one conceives of legitimacy. This, 
together with the fact that its legitimation practices often contradict one another, thus usually 
reduce its legitimacy in the eyes of these audiences for failing to show a coherent approach 
and for, at least sometimes, misjudging their concerns and priorities. Indeed, the UN’s 
legitimacy deficit in Congo was clear, with a majority of interviewees declaring the UN’s 
rhetoric and its actions were inconsistent and calling the UN ‘hypocritical’50 and 
‘theatrical.’51 In other words, the attempt to generate both procedural and output legitimacy in 
peace operations may ultimately inhibit the generation of either because most legitimacy 
audiences are aware of the discrepancy between the UN’s rhetoric and its actions, which 
leads to perceptions of inconsistency, unpredictability, and unreliability. In short, the UN’s 
balancing act appears to fail, and it is unable to fully reaffirm either of its identities through 
legitimation. 
 
Conclusion 
In a 2015 op-ed in The Telegraph, Mark Malloch-Brown, former Deputy Secretary-
General under Kofi Annan, decried ‘the heavy bureaucracy, the risk aversion and too often, 
the apparent abandonment of the exciting founding principles of peace, justice and human 
development that were intended to animate the UN’s activities’; in the same article, he also 
noted that the UN is highly ‘adaptable and nimble,’ has been far ahead of its time in terms of 
addressing new issues such as HIV/AIDS, and has never been afraid to tackle some of the 
globe’s most difficult problems, such as poverty and unequal socio-economic development. 
The UN stands for both principles and actions, and while in many ways it fails on both 
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counts, it also does remarkably well. In short, the UN is characterized by contradiction and 
inconsistency; indeed, its contradictory nature is in some ways its defining quality.  
This contradictory nature is particularly apparent in the UN’s peacekeeping 
operations. As a result and as described in this article, simplistic assessments of whether UN 
peacekeeping operations are or are not legitimate miss out on a number of key elements, 
including the fact that legitimacy is a contested and variable concept, one that is understood 
in different ways by different actors, and one that is claimed or sought in different ways. 
Because the UN as an organization faces conflicting operational and normative imperatives in 
peacekeeping—imperatives based on its dual normative and operational identities—it derives 
legitimacy from a variety of sources, most importantly procedural legitimacy and output 
legitimacy, which are based, respectively, on whether the organization’s behaviour is in line 
with key institutional norms and principles and on what it achieves and how efficiently.  
However, because the UN’s normative and operational identities come into conflict in 
the context of peacekeeping, so too do its legitimation efforts. Its efforts to seek procedural 
legitimacy through discourse, communication, and the symbolic inclusion of national actors, 
which are intended to demonstrate behaviour in line with the principles of self-determination 
and non-interference, and its efforts to seek output legitimacy through efficient if at times 
exclusive and unilateral action, which are intended to deliver on stated goals and targets, lead 
to a contradiction between its discourse and its practices. In the case of the host country 
population, these contradictory discursive and operational practices limit the effectiveness of 
the UN’s legitimation efforts and damage their overall perceptions of the UN’s legitimacy. It 
would not be surprising if the same were true, to varying degrees, for other legitimacy 
audiences in UN peacekeeping, such as TCCs, donors, and the Security Council.  
In an ideal situation, an actor or organization would not face contradictions that limit 
its ability to engage in legitimation—that is, the ‘right’ way to do something would also be 
the most efficient, thus enabling the actor to behave in line with all sides of its identity and 
satisfy various legitimacy criteria simultaneously. Indeed, the clash between output and 
procedural legitimacy need not inherently reduce overall legitimacy. As discussed, actors can 
retain legitimacy even where certain actions go against stated principles and, in selected 
instances, violation of principles in the interests of a particular output may be encouraged and 
applauded. However, as shown, I have found that the UN’s contradictory legitimation 
practices—and more broadly contradictions between procedural and output legitimacy in 
peacekeeping—lead to reduced perceptions of legitimacy, at least on the part of the local 
population. Ultimately, in the complex context of international peace operations, it appears 
that the UN’s dual identity is not something that can be overcome. Lipson (2007, 22) argues 
that policies and practices that ‘enhance an organization’s capacity to efficiently produce 
coordinated action may deprive it of the capacity to function as a political organization,’ and 
the converse is also true; in this sense, legitimacy types appear to be zero-sum because they 
would compel the UN to negate or eliminate one of its identities.  
In this way, it is likely that UN peacekeeping operations will always suffer from some 
degree of legitimacy deficit—depending on the type of legitimacy and the audience in 
question. The UN’s attempts to balance between different types of legitimacy then should not 
be judged too harshly. While the UN could stand to pay closer attention to the particular 
legitimacy concerns of different audiences and could potentially generate greater perceptions 
of legitimacy if it tailored its legitimation efforts more specifically, it will always have to 
engage in varying and contradictory legitimation practices, a reflection of the inherent 
tensions within the practice of peacekeeping and within its identity as an organization. 
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1 Some emphasize the need to justify the presence of peacekeepers because of what they 
describe as a dangerous similarity to colonialism or imperialism (see, for example, Richmond 
2004; Chandler 2006). Others focus on the distinction between the legality and morality of 
intervention, noting that the two do not always go hand in hand (see, for example, Nsia-Pepra 
2014; Ocran 2002). 
2 These are the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo (MONUC), the UN 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT). 
3 The UN is a vast and varied organization and can rarely be characterized in a way that 
captures all of its diversity; however, for expediency I here refer to the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its field missions as the UN. This does not, however, 
reflect a belief that the organization is monolithic in any way. 
4 A total of 74 interviews were conducted between November 2009 and January 2012 in New 
York, Geneva, London, and Kinshasa. One-to-one interviews are particularly effective in 
gauging perceptions and in enabling interviewees to speak openly; they were also feasible in 
terms of logistics, access, research ethics, and security.  
5 Numerous typologies of legitimacy exist. Weber (1978) famously posited three sources of 
political legitimacy: rational legality, tradition, and charisma. Scharpf (1999) distinguishes 
between input and output legitimacy, where the former is similar to procedural legitimacy 
and emphasizes the participatory nature of processes. Vivien Schmidt (2010) added 
throughput legitimacy to this, which is similar to procedural legitimacy in that it emphasizes 
‘the accountability, transparency and efficiency of…decision-making processes along with 
[an] openness to pluralist consultation’ (5). Weigand (2015) juxtaposes instrumental and 
substantive legitimacy, with the latter focusing on effectiveness, much like Scharpf’s output 
legitimacy. Easton (1965, 1975), while not discussing sources of legitimacy per se, 
distinguishes between diffuse and specific support, where the former entails an ongoing 
belief in the legitimacy of an actor to fill a certain role and the latter derives from the delivery 
of outputs that satisfy particular demands, and is thus very similar to output legitimacy. 
6 There are a variety of definitions of self-determination, both legal and political. Here, I use 
a political definition that conceives of self-determination as the opposite of external or 
foreign determination of a polity in relation to the population of the country in its entirety, but 
does not emphasize the self-determination of sub-national groups (Hannum 1990; Cassesse 
1995; Saul 2011; Wilde 2012). 
7 The orthodoxy that surrounds local ownership in contemporary peace operations is further 
evidence of this conviction. Local ownership is construed ‘not only as a moral imperative but 
also as a pragmatic necessity for legitimacy and sustainability’ (UN 2011, 2; see also 
Edomwonyi 2003; Donais 2009; von Billerbeck 2015). 
8 The building of peace is, of course, also a normative activity, not a purely operational one, 
particularly in light of the liberal content of much of what the UN seeks to achieve in its 
peacekeeping operations—democratization of the host state, liberalization of institutions, 
transparency of political processes, and so on. However, the liberal content of peacekeeping 
is likewise not purely normative, but also partly operational, as democracy and liberal 
governance are seen as protections against future conflict. The emphasis on them is thus only 
partly based on a belief that they are ‘right’ and partly on a belief that they will help to 
stabilize the host country. This, combined with the fact that peace and stability are the 
primary mandated goals of a peacekeeping operation, are why I conceive of peace here as an 
operational goal. 
9 There are, of course, other principles and outputs that concern these two sides of the UN, 
but in the context of peace operations, the dichotomy between self-determination and keeping 
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the peace is the most salient because they conflict with one another and thus this distinction 
retains analytical utility. Moreover, because self-determination and keeping the peace are 
broad categories, a number of more specific principles and outputs are subsumed within 
them, such as, for example, equality before the law, public participation, and security sector 
reform, thus demonstrating that they are not absolute. 
10 Though it can be more difficult to demonstrate that these are actually intended as 
legitimation practices, as opposed to simply engaging in mandated tasks, as shall be shown 
later, UN staff are highly aware of the need to demonstrate concrete outputs in order to secure 
legitimacy from audiences.  
11 Interview with senior UN official, New York, November 2009. 
12 Interview with senior MONUC official, New York, December 2010. 
13 Interviews with DPKO official, New York, November 2009, and senior DPKO/UNDP 
official, Geneva, May 2011.  
14 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2009. 
15 Interview with UN official, New York, November 2009. 
16 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010. 
17 These missions included the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
1999-2002, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) 2002-5, and UNMIT 
2006-2012. 
18 East Timor’s dependence on external support for the maintenance of security was most 
blatantly demonstrated in 2006 when tensions within the military and with the police erupted 
into violence less than a year after UNMISET left the country. 
19 The UN peacekeeping operation in Congo has been in place from 1999 until the present, 
first as the MONUC from 1999-2010 and subsequently as the Mission de l’Organisation des 
Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO). UNMIL has been in place 
since 2003.  
20 Interview with former senior UN military commander, London, October 2011. 
21 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010. 
22 Interviews with senior DPKO officials, New York, November 2009 and December 2010. 
23 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010. Also, interview with 
senior DPKO official, November 2009.  
24 Interviews with DPKO official, New York, November 2009, and with MONUC official, 
Kinshasa, March 2011. Mike Sedra (2006) calls this preference for working with elites with 
regards to security objectives a ‘slide towards expediency.’ 
25 Interviews with DPKO officials, New York, November 2009. 
26 Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009. 
27 Interview with DPKO/former UNMIT official, November 2009. 
28 Interview with senior DPKO/UNDP official, Geneva, May 2011. 
29 The referendum on independence was approved with 78.5% of the vote, with voter turnout 
of 98%, reflecting a high degree of unity among the population (UN 2002).  
30 Interview with senior MONUC official, Kinshasa, March 2011.  
31 Interview with MONUC official, New York, December 2010. 
32 This represents the period from the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in 
Sun City, South Africa until the mission changed name to the Mission de Organisation des 
Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo (MONUSCO). 
33 Interview with senior Congolese government official, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
34 Interview with Congolese government ambassador, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
35 Interview with Congolese government minister, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
36 Interview with Congolese government ambassador, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
 20 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
37 Interview with senior Congolese government official, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
38 Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
39 Interview with Congolese government ambassador, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
40 Interview with Congolese journalist, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
41 Interview with Congolese researcher, Kinshasa, March 2011. One academic described this 
in a slightly more forgiving way, but with the same assessment for popular views of the UN’s 
legitimacy: ‘The population wanted the UN to do everything—pacification, peace agreement, 
ceasefire, respect for human rights, etc.—but with that kind of expectation the UN can never 
deliver and so they think it did nothing.’ Interview with Congolese academic, March 2011. 
42 Interview with Congolese member of parliament, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
43 Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
44 Interview with Congolese civil society leader, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
45 Interview with Congolese civil society leader, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
46 Interview with Congolese member of parliament, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
47 Interview with Congolese academic, March 2011. 
48 Interview with Congolese academic, March 2011. 
49 While here I have not measured the variance in perceptions over time, it is possible that 
output might constitute a more important source of legitimacy for all audiences early on in a 
mission’s life span, when the security situation and peace agreement are at their newest and 
most fragile, with procedural legitimacy becoming more salient later. On the other hand, 
inclusive processes are important at the drafting of a peace agreement and if security and 
other deliverables diminish too quickly, resentment against a mission is likely to grow. In this 
way, any simple linear or inverse relationship may not hold and different sources of 
legitimacy are likely to ebb and flow on an ongoing basis.  
50 Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011.  
51 Interview with Congolese government ambassador, Kinshasa, March 2011. 
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